A monetary view of the balance of payments by Donald S. Kemp
uN surveying the body of research dealing with the
balance of payments, two major shortcomings are im-
mediately apparent.1 First, there are no widely ac-
cepted theories of the balance of payments which
simultaneously incorporate both the current and capi-
tal account. The great majority of models used in pay-
ments theory consider either the capital account or
the current account separately. Second, there have
been very few attempts to include even the funda-
mentals of portfolio choice theory in balance-of-pay-
ments models. This is particularly surprising in view
of the essentially monetary nature of payments theory.
This article presents an approach to payments the-
ory which addresses both of these shortcomings. Since
this essentially involves an extension of the rudiments
of monetary theory to the area of the balance of pay-
ments, it is henceforth referred to as a monetary view
of the balance of payments (MBOP).2
The MBOP may be summarized by the proposition
that the transactions recorded in balance-of-payments
(BOP) statistics reflect aggregate portfolio decisions
by both foreign and domestic economic units. Under
a system of fixed exchange rates, such as the gold
standard or the type of arrangement set up in 1944
at Bretton Woods, overall net surpluses (deficits) in
the trade and capital accounts are viewed as flows as-
sociated with either an excess demand for money on
the part of domestic (foreign) economic units or an
excess supply of money in foreign economies (the
domestic economy). Consequently, in analyzing the
rate of change of international reserves (the money
accounmt~)the monetary approach focuses on the de-
tenninants of the excess demand for or supply of
money. According to this view, surpluses (deficits) in
the money account measure the rate at which money
balances are being accumulated (reduced) domesti-
cally. That is, a BOP flow is one of the mechanisms
by which actual money balances are adjusted to their
desired levels.
Suppose, for example, there is an autonomous in-
crease in the money supply of country j, which leads
to an increase in the demand for goods, services, and
securities in that country. Under a system of fixed ex-
change rates, any such increase in domestic demand
will result in a tendency for prices of domestic real
and financial assets in country j to rise, in the short
run, relative to those in foreign markets. Economic
units in country j will react by decreasing their de-
mands for domestic real and financial assets in favor
of foreign assets while domestic suppliers of these
3The overall net balance in the trade and capital accounts will
henceforth be referred to as the money account. This re-
flects the fact that all transactions recorded below the line
in this account have a direct impact on a nation’s money
supply. Under a pure gold standard, changes in official gold
holdings are the only item below the line in this account.
Under a Bretton Woods type system changes in official hold-
ings of gold, SDRs, and foreign exchange and changes in the
reserve position at the IMF are all included below the line
in the money account.
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tThe theoretical foundatIon of this approach to payments
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(Pacific Palisades California: Goodyear, 1971). The fonnal
model, presented later in this article, draws extensively on
work done at the University of Chicago Workshop in Inter-
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Theory,” Further Essays in Monetary Economics (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press 1973), pp. 229-49. This article is
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Page 14FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1975
assets will seek to sell more at home and less abroad.
At the same time, foreign economic units will decrease
their demands for the assets of country j and foreign
suppliers will attempt to sell more of their own assets
in country j. All of these factors work in favor of an
increase in imports and a decrease in exports in
country j. The resultant deterioration of the BOP re-
flects the exchange of money balances for real and
financial assets by economic units of country j. The
foreign recipients of these money balances will con-
vert them into their own currencies at their respective
central banks. These foreign central banks will then
present the balances to the central bank in country
in return for international reserves, Since international
reserves are one of the components of a country’s
monetary base4, the effect of this transaction will be
a decrease in the money supply of country j towards
its level prior to the autonomous increase and an
increase in the money supplies of its surplus trading
partners.
Under a system of freely floating exchange rates,
the required adjustment of money balances is ac-
complished through movements in the exchange rate.
Under such a system the BOP (on a money account
basis) equals zero by definition and there are no
intercountry movements of international reserves. As
such, required adjustments in money balances cannot
be accommodated through balance—of-payments flows.
In this case the adjustment of actual money balances
to their desired levels is accomplished by changes in
domestic prices and exchange rates (which change
concomitantly with and accommodate the required
movement in domestic price levels).
The above approach is in sharp contrast with what
amounts to the current conventional wisdom of pay-
ments theory; namely, the elasticities and absorption
approaches. Implicit in both of these approaches is
the assumption that either there are no monetary
consequences associated with the BOP, or that to the
extent the potential for such consequences exists, they
can he and are absorbed (sterilized) by domestic
monetary authorities.5
4
For a detailed discussion and analysis of the concept of the
monetary base, see Lconall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan,
rhe Monetary Base — Explanation and Analytical Use,” this
Review (August 1968), pp. 7-11.
5
The elasticity-and absorption approaches are theories of the
trade account alone and they neglect the issue of capital
flows. For a discussion of the essentials of the elastIcities
approach, see Joan Robinson, “The Foreign Exchanges,”
Readings in the Theory of International Trade, Committee
of the American Economic Association (Philadelphia: The
Blakiston Company, 1949), pp. 83-103. For a discussion of
the absorption approach, see Sidney S. Alexander, “Effects of
The MBOP regards all BOP deficits and surpluses
and movements in floating exchange rates as phases
in a stock adjustment which are the result of a dis-
parity between the demand for and supply of money.
This approach asserts that, under a system of fixed
exchange rates, there are inflows (outflows) of inter-
national reserves associated with BOP surpluses (def-
icits) and that these flows cannot be sterilized in
the long run. Furthermore, because of the impact of
these reserve flows on a country’s monetary base, they
will result in variations in the supply of money rela-
tive to the demand for it and thus have an equili-
brating impact on the level of money balances and
the BOP. According to this view, the only way to
obtain persistent deficits or surpluses is to construct a
model in which the need for stock adjustments is
being continuously recreated.
The only solutions to these reserve flows are proc-
esses which facilitate the return of actual money bal-
ances to their desired levels. This adjustment can be
accomplished either automatically, through inflows or
outflows of international reserves, or through ap-
propriate actions by the domestic monetary authorities
which change some other component of the monetary
base by the same amount. Under a system of freely
floating exchange rates the adjustment is also ac-
complished either automatically by changes in domes-
tic price levels and the concomitant changes in the
exchange rate, or again by the appropriate actions
on the part of the monetary authorities. The only
other potentially successful policy actions available
are those which, in the end, have the same effect on
money balances as those just mentioned.
In order to facilitate the development of a model
later in this article, there are some fundamental prop-
ositions associated with the MBOP that should be
discussed.
1) The MBOP maintains that the transactions re-
corded in the balance of payments are essentially a
reflection of monetary phenomena. As such, it places
emphasis on the direct influence of an excess demand
for or supply of money on the BOP.
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that the
demand for and supply of money are stable functions
a Devaluation on a Trade Balance,” Readings in International
Economics, Committee of the American Economic Association
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard 1). Irwin, Inc., 1968), pp. 359-
73. For a discussion of the differences between the mone-
tarists’ approach and both the elasticities and absorption ap-
proaches to payments theory, see Johnson, “The Monetary
Approach to Balance-of-Payments Theory,’ pp. 229-49.
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of a limited number of variables. The MBOP does not
imply that changes in the money supply are the only
factors which affect the BOP. It nevertheless does say
that the primary channel by which changes in any
real variable affect the BOP is through their effects
on the demand for or supply of money.6 Thus, any
analysis of the impact of a policy or other change must
begin with an analysis of how this change generates
a divergence between actual and desired money bal-
ances or affects such a divergence that already exists.
2) In the analysis presented in this article, the
crucial BUP concept is that xvluch captures all trans-
actions reflecting the adjustment of actual money
balances to their desired levels. That is, the only
transactions considered below the line are those which
have an influence on domestic and foreign monetary
bases and thus on domestic and foreign money
supplies.7
The analysis presented here does not attempt to
provide a theory of the individual subaccounts; it
merely lumps the individual components (goods, serv-
ices, transfers, short- and long-term capital) into a
single category — “items above the- line.” This ap-
proach recognizes that an excess supply of or demand
for money may be cleared through the markets for
either goods, services, or securities.8 Furthermore, if
the BOP is viewed within this framework, the pitfalls
of placing emphasis on any particular subaccount are
obvious. For example, the effects on aggregate eco-
nomic activity of a deficit in the merchandise trade
account could be neutralized by a surplus in one of the
capital accounts. In this case, any negative aggregate
demand effects resulting from an increase in imports
of goods would be offset by an inflow of capital and
thus an increase in investment demand. The two ef-
‘For an analysis of the BOP effects of changes in a real varia-
He (a change in tariff) within a snonetarist’s framework, see
Michael Mussa, “A Monetary Approach to Balance-of-Pay-
ments Analysis,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
(August 1974), pp. 333-51.
fects would offset each other and aggregate money
balances would be unchanged.
3) The MBOP relies on the assumption of an ef-
ficient world market for goods, services, and securi-
ties.9 Under a system of fixed exchange rates, the
price of any good or service in one country relative
to its price in any other country can change only
in the short run. Likewise, the rate of return on any
asset can differ from the rate of return on assets of
comparable risk and maturity in any other country
only in the short run. It follows that in the long run
price levels and interest rates in all countries must
move rigidly in line with one another. In fact, in a
fixed exchange rate regime it is the attempts to arbi-
trage intercountry price and interest rate differentials
that are the driving force leading to the reduction or
accumulation of money balances and a concomitant
temporary BOP deficit or surplus.
Under a system of freely floating exchange rates,
price levels may move at different rates between
countries. However, the impact of these differential
rates of change on individual relative prices between
countries is offset by opposite movements in exchange
rates. The same arbitrage opportunities that lead to
reserve flows under fixed rates lead to exchange rate
adjustments that exactly compensate for differential
price level changes between countries.
4) The MBOP is a theory of an automatic adjust-
ment process. According to this theory, any BOP dis-
equilibrium or exchange rate movement reflects a dis-
parity between actual and desired money balances
and will automatically correct itself. While the adjust-
ment process is different under different exchange
rate regimes, the implication is that the process is
automatic and that its effects cannot be neutralized
in the long run. Any BOP imbalance or exchange rate
change is a phase in the automatic adjustment process
and attempts to counter these processes merely in-
crease the forces wInch give rise to the adjustment
ultimately required for a return to equilibrium.
7
For a review of balance-of-payments concepts and their
meaning, see John Pippenger, “Balance-of-Payments Defi-
cits: Measurement and Interpretation,” this Review (Novem-
ber 1973), pu 6—14, For a discussion of which transactions
to include below the line, see footnote 3 of this article.
~‘Fhis is not to say the MBOP framework would not he useful
in analyzing individual subacc-ounts. 1-lowever, such analysis
would require a rigorous specification of the channels of
monetary influence. For a survey and analysis of the litcrn—
ture pertaining to these channels, see Roger W. Spencer,
“Channels of Monetary Influence: A Survey,’ this Review
(November 1974), pp. 8-26, For an example of how this
framework could be applied to the analysis of tile capital
account alone, see Pentti J. K. Kouri and Michael C. Porter,
“International Capital Flows and Portfolio Equilibrium,” Jour-






MBOP is concerned primarily with the
The approach recognizes that short-run
often complicated by the fact that the
adjustment behavior is incomplete in the
For example, the adjustment of actual
9
While it is acknowledged that there are some goods that are
not traded internationally, there are limits to relative price
changes between these non—traded goods and other ( traded
goods. ‘l’he higher the elasticities of substitution between
these two classes of goods in both production and con-
sumption, the smaller the scope for relative price changes and
the more direct the international price interdependence.
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money balances to their desired levels does not occur
instantaneously, but rather requires the passage of
time. As another example, it is possible that the
monetary authorities may attempt to neutralize the
impact of international reserve flows on their respec-
tive money supplies in the short run.1°However, the
MBOP asserts that governments cannot follow such
policies in the long run. This seems reasonable be-
cause, in the long run, success in neutralizing the
effects of international reserve flows implies that the
governments of some (surplus) countries are willing
to trade investment and consumption goods for
foreign currency balances. The accumulation of these
balances by surplus country governments represents a
nonmarket induced transfer of wealth away from
domestic to foreign consumers. For whatever reason,
it is unrealistic to suppose that a government would
pursue such policies in the long run.
6) An implication of this theory is that, under a
system of fixed exchange rates, domestic monetary
policy does not control a country’s money supply. Ex-
cessive monetary expansion (contraction), via expan-
sion (contraction) of some controllable component of
the monetary base, will result in an outflow (infloxv)
of international reserves (an uncontrollable compon-
ent of the monetary base) and a tendency for the
money supply to return to its former level.” The re-
sulting BOP deficit (surplus) is only a reflection of
these uncontrollable international reserve outflows (in-
flows). Through this process, the inflationary or defla-
tionary impact of domestic monetary policy is miti-
gated with respect to the domestic economy and is
imposed on the rest of the world via inter-country
flows of international reserves. At the same time,
however, the domestic economy is subject to the in-
fluence of inflationary or deflationary monetary ac-
tions taken in other countries.
Under a system of freely floating exchange rates,
the domestic monetary authorities retain dominant
control over the money supply, while the interaction
of domestic and foreign monetary policies deter-
mines the exchange rate rather than the BOP (xvhich
is now zero by definition). In this case, a country
neither imports nor exports international reserves. As
a result, the domestic economy is subjected to the full
consequences of inflationary or deflationary domestic
tm0
For an annlvsis of West Cennan attempts to neutralize the
effects of reserve flows, see Manfred WilIms, “Controlling
Money in an Open Economy: The Gennan Case,” this
Review (April 1971), pp. 10-27.
‘‘While this is tme for most countries, it is not necessarily tile
case for a reserve currency country. The special case of a
reserve currency country will be discussed in the next section.
monetary policies and is insulated from the effects of
monetary actions taken in other countries.
7) Another feature of the MBOP is that it provides
a framework within which one is able to assess the
differential impact of monetary disturbances which
occur in a world in svhich there is at least one re-
serve currency country (11CC) as opposed to those
occurring in a world with no 11CCs. An 11CC is a
country whose currency is held by others as a form of
international reserves, It is this special status afforded
to the currency of the 11CC which leads to a slightly
altered adjustment process for the world and the 11CC
itself.
Because international reserves and reserve curren-
cies exist only under a system of fixed exchange rates,
the following analysis applies only to that case. For
all non-11CCs, expansionary (contractionary) mone-
tary policies are offset by a BOP deficit (surplus) and
the resulting contraction (expansion) of the interna-
tional reserve coniponent of the monetary base. How-
ever, for an 11CC this need not be the case. An ex-
pansionary (contractionary) monetary policy in the
11CC may have no effect on its BOP as defined in this
article. However, the 11CC’s trading partners will al-
ways experience a BOP surplus (deficit) and an inflow
(outflow) of international reserves as a result of such
11CC policies.’2 The reason for this is that the 11CC
currency is held by foreign central banks as a form of
international reserves. While non-11CC monetary au-
thorities are not willing to accumulate large balanc?s
denominated in other non-11CC currencies, they are
willing to accumulate large balances denominated in
the 11CC currency. Because these balances are them-
selves a type of international reserves, non-11CC mon-
etary authorities may not be inclined to present them
to the 11CC authorities in exchange for other inter-
national reserves.
I-Iowever, to the extent that the 11CC loses no inter-
national reserves as a result of an increase in other
components of its monetary base, it does experience
an accumulation of liquid liabilities to foreign official
holders.’5 As these liabilities of the 11CC are re-
‘
tm
flecall that the flOP concept used in this article is the bal-
ance in the money account. That is, the only ite,ns re-
corded below the line are those that affect the doineslic
money supply.
LiWhile the accumulations or reductions of the holdings of
liabilities do not affect the RCC balance of payments as
defined in this article, they do affect some RCC balance-of-
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garded as assets by foreign official holders, their ac-
cumulation represents an inflow of international re-
serves and a BOP surplus for RCC trading partners.
The how and why of all of this can be brought out
by reference tothe balance sheets of the world’s mone-
tary authorities. WInle the following analysis applies
to the case of expansionary monetary policy in the
11CC, it is equally applicable- to the analysis of con-
tractionary monetary policy. In addition, in order to
simplify the analysis we will assume that foreign
central banks invest all of their 11CC currency hold-
ings in government securities issued by the 11CC.
However, we fully recognize that this need not be
the case. Non-RCC central banks can and frequently
do invest their 11CC currency holdings in other assets
or simply allow them to accumulate as deposits at the
11CC central bank. Whatever the non-11CC authori-
ties decide to do, however, all that is crucial for our
analysis to hold is that they do not accumulate de-
posits at the 11CC central bank.
Illustration I indicates what happens to the mone-
tary bases of all countries as a result of an attempt
by the 11CC monetary authorities to increase the
domestic money supply in the face of a fixed demand
for money. Tier (A) illustrates that the initial impact
of such an undertaking is to increase the monetary
base of the 11CC only. Tier (B) illustrates what hap-
pens to the respective monetary bases as a result of
the forthcoming intercountry reserve flows. Non-11CCs
accumulate international reserves (11) in the form of
deposits denominated in the 11CC currency held at
the 11CC central bank. As long as these 11 are held in
this form, the 11CC monetary base decreases towards
its initial level and the non-RCC monetary bases in-
crease, just as in the case of a world in which there
are no RCCs.
Since the non-11CCs view these reserve cunency
balances as 11, they are willing to accumulate them
in the same manner that they accumulate other 11.
1-lowever, these 11 differ from others in one significant
aspect — namely, they can be invested in government
securities issued by the 11CC. When non-RCCs choose
to do this, the effects are as illustrated in tier (C).
When non-RCC monetary authorities purchase 11CC
government securities, the OL entry in the 11CC bal-
ance sheet is drawn down. This has the effect of in-
creasing the monetary base of the 11CC without caus-
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The net effect of all of this is that the monetary bases
of all countries have increased (as shown in the NET
tier).
In view of the above analysis, a world in which
there exists at least one 11CC differs significantly from
a world in which there are no 11CCs. In a world with
11CCs, BOP deficits and surpluses may by themselves
decrease and increase the level of 11 in the world and
in individual countries. In a world with no RCCs,
BOP deficits and surpluses result in a redistribution
of an existing stock of 11 among countries, but pro-
duce no change in the overall level. As a result, in
a world with RCCs, the world and each individual
non-11CC will ordinarily experience much more dif-
ficulty in controlling its money supply. Thus, the
existence of 11CCs compounds the problems of money
stock control which are already inherent in any sys-
tem of fixed exchange rates.
In addition, this analysis implies that the inflation-
ary or deflationary impact of 11CC monetary policy is
spread over the entire world. Unlike the case of a
non-11CC, however, there may be no mitigation of the
payments concepts. For example, such transactions would
affect the Official Settlements Balance in the United States.
Page 18FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1975
impact on the domestic economy since the 11CC may
neither gain nor lose reserves. As a result, prices in
the 11CC could change by the same amount as they
would under a system of freely floating exchange
rates. What’s worse, however, is that the rest of the
world will gain or lose international reserves and bear
the same price level impact as the RCC. Thus, the
potential for large BOP surpluses and deficits and for
world wide inflations and deflations are greater under
a fixed exchange rate system with RCCs than under
any other system considered in this article.
/
Now that the essential features of the MBOP have
been spelled out, let us turn to the derivation of a
model in which these features are expressed by a set
of equations.” First, the model is derived for a non-
11CC under a system of fixed exchange rates. Second,
the same model is applied to the case of an 11CC
under fixed exchange rates. Finally, the model is
applied to the case of freely floating exchange rates.
The common elements in each of these models are
stable money demand and money supply functions.15
The money supply function for each country may be
stated as
(1) MS, = a
1 [Kj + D,]
where: MS, = money supply in country j
a, = money multiplier in country
B, = official holdings of international reserves
in country hereafter referred to as the
international component of the monetary
base.
D, = all other components of the monetary
base in country j; hereafter referred to as
the domestically controlled component of
the monetary base.
D, ±II, = MB, = monetary base in country j
The demand for money in each country is assumed to
be a function of real income, the nominal rate of in-
terest, and prices.
(2) MD, = f,[y,, r, P1
where: MD, = demand for money in country
P = price index in the world and thus in
country ~
= real income in country
= nominal rate of interest in the world and
thus in country j.
In accordance with the general monetarist frame-
work of the model, country ji sin equilibrium if and
only if the growth of the supply of money equals
the growth of the demand for money. We are able to
specify the conditions necessary for fulfilling this re-
quirement by expressing equations (1) and (2) in
terms of rates of change and then equating the result-
ing expressions. This procedure allows us to derive
an expression for the rate of growth of international
reserves in country j.”
(3) -~j~-g’t, = g0 + a,g,, + Thg~— gn~
where: a
1
= income elasticity of demand for money in
country j
p, = interest rate elasticity of‘demand for money
in country j.
We are able to derive an expression for the growth
rate of world prices [g0] by summing the expres-
sions for the growth rates of the demand for and
supply of money over all countries and equating the
resultant expressions.
(4) g,, = w,gMs, w,[a,gv, + P,g,-]
i=I i=1
where: w, = ~~-‘ = weights calculated on the basis of
- money supplies converted by cx-
= change rates to equivalent units of
currency
Recall that by definition g~i = ~- ~ Under a
system of fixed exchange rates in a world in which
there are no reserve currency countries, is the
expression for the balance of payments in the money
account. It represents the rate at which country j is
either gaining or losing international reserves during
a given time period (t). With this in mind, and upon
making some simplifying assumptions regarding the
interest and income elasticities of demand for money,
move in line with the world price level and interest rates.
However, in the case of freely floating exchange rates the
assumption regarding the price level is no longer valid. As
such, the money demand function must be specified some-
what differently in that case.
17
Henceforth in this article gx = That is, g
1
is the ex-
pression for the continuous rate of growth of variable x,
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~In order to simplify the presentation, many of the steps
in the derivation of the model have been bypassed in the
text. For the interested reader, a more thorough presenta-
tion of the model is provided in an appendix, which is
available from this Bank upon request.
“For an analysis of the development of the money supnly
function employed in this article, see Jerry L. Jordan, “Ele-
ments of Money Stock Determination,” this Review (Octo-
ber 1969), pp. 10-19.
~This reflects the assumption that under a system of fixed
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we are able to substitute expression (4) into expres-
sion (3) and get an expression for the balance of pay-
mentsin country j.’8
1 N D, N




Expression (5) is essentially an embodiment of the
features of the price specie flow mechanism, which
operates under a system of fixed exchange rates in a
world in which there are no reserve currency coun-
tries.19 That is, expression (5) states that the BOP is
a function of:
1) the rate of growth of real income in country j
relative to the average rate of growth of real income
for all countries, and
2) the rate of growth of the domestically controlled
component of the monetary base in country j relative
to an average rate of money growth for the whole
world.
In a world in which there is at least one 11CC,
expression (5) is still an appropriate representation
of the forces giving rise to BOP flows in non-RCCs.
However, for an 11CC there may be no international
reserve flows associated with the BOP accounts; in
which case ga~= 0. In the case of an 11CC, exces-
sive expansion (contraction) of the domestically con-
trolled component of the monetary base need not
lead to an offsetting contraction (expansion) of the
international reserve component. At the same time,
however, excessive expansion (contraction) of the do-
mestically controlled component of the monetary base
N
‘8We have assumed that a,1 for all i and that Ii~ ~ w,$,.
i=1
Neither of these assumptions arc crucial to the analysis at
hand. They are invoked here mainly to simplify the pre-
sentation. The assumption that a, = 1 is interpreted as as-
suming that the iocon,e elasticity of demand for money is
N
unity in all countries. Assuming that I sv,P, = means
that the interest elasticity of demand’for money in country
is equal to a weighted average of the interest elasticities of
demand for money in all countries. A more restrictive im-
plication of this assumption would be that the interest elas-
ticities are equal in all countries.
~Thc price specie flow mechanism is an attempt to explain
international gold flows under the gold standard. It is as-
sociated primarily with the work of David flume in the 18th
century. However, in our case the BOP inch,des more than
just gold flows. It includes flows of all international re-
serves — gold, SDHs, foreign exchange, and reserve positions
atthe IMF.
in the 11CC will lead to an accumulation (reduction)
of international reserves in all other countries. As
mentioned previously, we will assume that these in-
ternational reserves will be held in the form of
securities issued by the 11CC government to non-RCC
official holders. For tile RCC, it is the net accumu-
lation or reduction of such liabilities that is de-
termined by monetary actions in our model. This
process can be captured in our model by setting
gaam.c~= 0 (where the 11CC is the jth country) and
N
replacing the term 2 sv,gus in expression (5) with
i=1
a more detailed formulation of the factors contributing
to the growth of the money supply in all countries.
1 N fl
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where: MB~= the sum of the monetary bases of all
countries in the world.
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500
= the net accumulation of claims against
the RCC by foreign official institutions
during tisne period (t).
2
°
This expression states that the change in the level
of the liabilities of the 11CC to foreign official holders
that results from domestic monetarypolicy in the 11CC
is determined by the following:
1) the rate of growth of the domestically controlled
component of the monetaiy base in the 11CC
relative to a weighted average of its rate of growth
in all countries.
2) the rate of gro’vth of real inco,ne in the RCC
relative to a weighted average of the rates of
growth of real income in all countries.
For the case of freely floating exchange rates, two
modifications of the model are necessary. First, the
model mustbe adapted to reflectthe fact that there are
no international reserveflows, so that the growth rate of
a country’s money supply is determined solely by do-
mestic monetary policy [gLDJ. Second, the money
demand function must be modified to reflect the fact
that the rate of price level change in one country
may differ from the rate prevailing in the rest of the
world.
tm0
For the United States this BOP concept closely resembles the
balance on liabilities to foreign official holders. However,
this account is distinctly different from the BOP concept
utilized in equation (5). Equation (5) explains the balance
in the money account, whereas the BOP concept used in
equation (6) has no relation to the money supply.
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Upon incorporating both of these modifications into
the model, we are able to derive an expression for the
determination of movements in the exchange rate.
(7) gz, = [g,u
50
-~ — gasJ] + [gy~ —
Where: E, = ~ = the price of currency j in terms of
~m foreign currencies
N—i
= ~ hP, = the price level in the rest of the
= 1 world; that is, a weighted average
of the price levels in all other
countries.
h, = = weights calculated on the basis of
real CNP
= price level in country
This expression states that the exchange value of
currency j in terms of foreign currencies is determined
by the rate of growth of tue money supply and real
income in country j relative to the rate of growth
of the money supply and real income respectively in
the rest of the world. As such, it implies that cur-
rency depreciations are the result of excessive mone-
tary growth. It therefore supports the proposition that
inflation causes depreciation of the domestic cur-
rency rather than vice versa.
The MBOP may be summarized by the proposition
that the transactions recorded in balance-of-payments
statistics reflect aggregate portfolio decisions by both
foreign and domestic economic units. The framework
presented in this article suggests some important pol-
icy considerations that cannot be addressed within
the framework which characterizes most of tile cur-
rently accepted body of payments theory.
The analysis presented here casts the balance of
payments in the role of an automatic adjustment
mechanism. Balance-of-payments deficits and sur-
pluses, or movements in freely floating exchange rates,
are viewed as being simultaneously both the result of
a divergence between actual and desired money bal-
ances and a mechanism by which such a divergence
is corrected. As such, persistent balance-of-payments
deficits (surpltmses) or depreciations (appreciations)
of the foreign exchange value of a currency reflect a
continual re-creation of a situation in which excessive
monetary expansion in the country in question is
greater (less) than the worldwide average. Further-
more, the only solution to such international distur-
bances are policies which facilitate the equalization
of actual and desired money balances.
The futility of tariff and non-tariff harriers to trade
which attempt to alter balance-of-payments flows or
exchange rate movements becomes readily apparent
when one views them within the framework presented
above. Suppose, for example, that an import tariff is
imposed with the aim of reducing a balance-of-pay-
ments deficit in the money account. According to the
MBOP, international reserve flows will assure that the
balance-of-payments deficit disappears in the long run
whether the tariff is imposed or not. That is, even if
the tariff were not imposed, the excess money bal-
ances, and therefore the deficit, would disappear as
a result of the outflow of international reserves. How-
ever, if the tariff is imposed, relative prices will be
artificially altered from the levels consistent with the
most efficient allocation of resources and maximum
gains from trade. Furthermore, the situation is no
better if the tariff is imposed in retaliation against
restrictive trade practices on the part of other
nations. In this case, all that the tariff accomphshes
is to further distort relative prices and further reduce
the welfare of all nations.
Another advantage of the MBOP is that it enables
one to clearly evaluate the relative desirability of dif-
ferent exchange rate regimes in terms of their promo-
tion of autonomy of domestic monetary policy and
domestic as well as worldwide price stability. Under
a system of freely floating exchange rates a country
retains dominant control over its money growth, incurs
the full consequences of its domestic monetary policy,
and is not subject to the effects of inflationary or
deflationary monetary policies undertaken in other
countries. Under a system of fixed exchange rates in
a world in which there are no reserve currency coun-
tries, a country loses control of its rate of money
growth, has the domestic impact of its monetary pol-
icy mitigated, and is subject to the effects of monetary
policies pursued by other countries. Under a system
of fixed exchange rates in a world in which there is
at least one reserve currency country, we have the
potential for tile worst of both of the above systems.
While tile impact of expansionary (contractionary)
monetary policies in the reserve currency country is
imposed on the rest of the world, there may be no
mitigation of their domestic impact. As a result, the
entire world is prone towards large changes in its
money supply which are initiated by actions taken
ill the reserve currency country. This conclusion ap-
pears td)he consistent with the inflationary experiences
of the \vestern world which began in the late 1960s.
Finally, if the balance of payments is viewed within
the MBOP framework, the pitfalls of placing emphasis
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on any particular BOP subaccount are obvious. A
deficit (surplus) in any one account need not have
any effect on domestic aggregate economic activity if
its impact on money balances is offset by a surplus
(deficit) in another account.
This point is especially significant in view of the
large merchandise trade deficits that many oil con-
suming countries have been experiencing. The an-
alysis presented in this article indicates that the im-
pact of these deficits on money balances, and there-
fore on aggregate economic activity in the deficit
countries, will be substantially reduced as a result of
large inflows of capital from OPEC members. Of
course this does not mean that oil consuming coun-
tries are no worse off now than they were prior to
the fourfold increase in oil prices. The MBOP merely
states that the impact on CNP will he mitigated
through subsequent inflows of capital. The distribu-
tion of a given GNP between the residents of oil
consuming and oil producing countries however, is
altered in favor of the oil producers.
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